A new measure of implicit theories or beliefs regarding the traitedness versus contextuality of behavior was developed and tested across cultures. In Studies 1 (N ϭ 266) and 2 (N ϭ 266), these implicit beliefs dimensions were reliably measured and replicated across U.S. college student samples and validity evidence was provided. In Study 3, their structure replicated well across an individualistic culture (the United States; N ϭ 249) and a collectivistic culture (Mexico; N ϭ 268). Implicit trait and contextual beliefs overlapped only modestly with implicit entity theory beliefs and were predicted by self-construals in ways that generally supported cultural psychology hypotheses. Implicit trait beliefs were fairly strongly endorsed in both cultures, suggesting that such beliefs may be universally held.
Current research on personality and culture is dominated by two theoretical perspectives, the trait perspective and the cultural psychology perspective. Cross-cultural trait psychologists argue that traits provide a meaningful basis for understanding and predicting behavior in all cultures and point to cogent theoretical perspectives and empirical findings that are consistent with the existence of universal trait dimensions (Church, 2000; McCrae, 2000) . At the same time, some cultural psychologists have questioned the utility of the trait concept, at least for individuals in more collectivistic cultures, where the contextual nature of behavior is emphasized (Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Shweder, 1991) . In short, these two perspectives raise a fundamental question: How important are personality traits versus contextual factors in understanding persons and their behavior in various cultures? In the present studies, we did not address the actual "traitedness" or contextuality of behavior. Rather, we report on the development and cross-cultural generalizability of a new measure of implicit beliefs about the traitedness versus contextuality of behavior.
Why Measure Implicit Trait Theories
Implicit theories, lay beliefs, or "naïve" psychologies play an important role in individuals' explanations and predictions of behavior (Dweck, 2000; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002) . In addition, a number of psychologists have hypothesized that the cultural differences found in studies of self-concepts, dispositional inference, and self-enhancement biases may be the result of cultural differences in implicit theories. People in individualistic cultures-who are thought to construe persons as independent agents (Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Triandis, 1995) -are hypothesized to have stronger implicit beliefs regarding the "traitedness" of behavior. This, in turn, leads to stronger emphases on (a) trait attributes as an aspect of self-concept, (b) trait inference in the observation of others, and (c) self-enhancement in the evaluation of one's own traits (e.g., Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995) .
In contrast, people in collectivistic cultures-who are thought to construe persons as interdependent and connected to in-groupsare hypothesized to have weaker beliefs regarding the traitedness of behavior and stronger beliefs regarding the role of contextual factors. This, in turn, leads to (a) greater focus on roles and relationships as aspects of self-concept, (b) greater attention to situational information in causal inferences about behavior, and (c) weaker tendencies to self-enhance (and perhaps even tendencies to self-criticize) in self-descriptions. Attempts to test these hypotheses will require instruments that measure individual and cultural differences in implicit theories regarding the traitedness versus contextuality of behavior, which we refer to here as implicit trait versus implicit contextual theories.
Implicit trait theories may encompass at least the following component beliefs: (a) belief in the longitudinal stability of personality traits; (b) belief in the cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behavior; (c) belief in the ability to predict individuals' behavior from their traits; (d) the belief that traits can be readily inferred from relatively few behavioral instances; and (e) the belief that people can be accurately described and understood in terms of their traits. These component beliefs are suggested by theorists' conceptions of lay dispositionism (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 1991) , empirical studies Dweck, 2000; Norenzayan et al., 2002) , and logical considerations, which suggest that these component beliefs will tend to coexist in the same individuals. For example, believing that traits can predict or be inferred from behavior would seem to depend on beliefs in the longitudinal and cross-situational stability of traits.
In contrast, when cultural psychologists refer to the contextual determinants of self or behavior, they refer to such factors as "situations, roles, or the larger social context" (Norenzayan et al., 2002, p. 110) or to "social structures and interpersonal frameworks such as families, work groups, social roles, positions, or relationships" (Markus & Kitayama, 1998, p. 70) . Trait psychologists, who refer to transcontextual consistencies across time, situations, and social roles, have a similar view of what constitutes context (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1984; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997) . Such conceptions of contextuality lead us to delineate and assess the following contextual beliefs, which contrast with each of the five implicit trait belief components: (a) longitudinal or temporal instability of traits; (b) cross-situational variability; (c) lack of predictive validity; (d) difficulty of trait inference; and (e) the perceived greater importance of contextual factors such as roles, statuses, and relationships, as compared with traits, in person description.
We examined many implicit theory constructs and measures to see if they might assess these component beliefs, but only two were deemed directly relevant. Norenzayan et al. (2002) used paragraph descriptions of dispositional, situationist, and interactionist lay theories, which appear promising. However, these paragraphs combine or blend components of lay dispositionism or situationism into single descriptions rather than measuring the components separately. Thus, the authors assumed rather than empirically tested whether the component beliefs co-occur in the same individuals. Potentially most relevant, and thus warranting a more extensive comparison, is Dweck's (2000) implicit entity theory construct.
Implicit Trait Versus Implicit Entity Theories
Dweck and her colleagues have focused on implicit theories about whether attributes are fixed (the view of entity theorists) or malleable (the view of incremental theorists). Recent studies have examined these theories in the domains of morality and personality (for reviews, see Dweck, 2000; . These researchers have reasoned that individuals who believe in fixed traits will expect a high degree of consistency in trait-relevant behavior; thus, traits will be seen to have predictive value and will be readily inferred from sparse information about behavior. In contrast, incremental theorists, who view traits as more dynamic and malleable, will expect behavior to be more variable across time and situations; thus, traits will be seen as less predictive of behavior and less crucial or possible to infer from behavior.
There is some resemblance between Dweck's (2000) entity theory construct and our implicit trait theory construct, but we also note some differences. First, Dweck's construct addresses directly only the longitudinal stability component of implicit trait beliefs (i.e., fixed vs. malleable traits). Thus, our implicit trait theory construct should lead to a more comprehensive assessment of the multiple aspects of lay dispositionism. Second, entity theorists apparently take a more rigid stance on the possibility of longitudinal change than most trait theorists would. For example, as stated by Dweck (2000, p. 88) , "simply put, entity theorists don't grant people the potential to grow." Indeed, the entity theory items (e.g., "Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that.") suggest a degree of inflexibility in those who strongly agree with them. This might account, in part, for some of the negative behavioral correlates that have been linked to entity theorists, such as tendencies to be more judgmental, punitive, and prone to social stereotyping than incremental theorists (e.g., Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, & Sacks, 1997; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998) . In contrast, in our conception of implicit trait theories, the longitudinal component is presented as more probabilistic than deterministic (e.g., "People who are friendlier than others now will probably remain friendlier than others in the future as well"). Trait psychologists do not view traits as fixed or nonmalleable, but only as relatively stable over time, at least as reflected in the rank ordering of individuals.
Finally, the entity theory construct has not been applied much across cultures, and when it has, the results have sometimes been inconsistent with the expectations of cultural psychologists. If cultural psychologists are correct that people focus more on traits in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures, entity theorists should be more prevalent in individualistic cultures. Indeed, Norenzayan et al. (2002) found this to be the case in a comparison of American and Korean samples. However, neither Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1997, Study 4) nor found this to be true in comparisons of Hong Kong and American samples. In sum, although we do not question the value of the entity theory construct, nor the impressive empirical findings associated with it (Dweck, 2000) , we determined that it might not capture the implicit theory distinction we were interested in, particularly given our focus on testing cross-cultural hypotheses.
Overview of the Present Studies
Like , Norenzayan et al. (2002) , and others, we assume that implicit theories can be directly assessed using selfreport. Although implicit beliefs may not be at the forefront of everyday consciousness, nor commonly articulated spontaneously, we assume that individuals can meaningfully endorse statements that do articulate such beliefs.
We conducted three studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we (a) tried out items that assess the hypothesized components of implicit trait (and contextual) beliefs in U.S. samples; (b) investigated the structure of the implicit trait theory domain; and (c) provided initial validity evidence for the measure. In Study 3, we examined the structural equivalence of the measure across an individualistic culture (United States) and a collectivistic culture (Mexico) and tested hypotheses relating implicit theories to independent and interdependent self-construals. In Hofstede's (1983) value-based ranking of 50 cultures along the individualism-collectivism continuum, the United States ranked first and Mexico ranked 31st. Many other researchers have described Mexican culture as being collectivistic, with its emphases on close family ties, long-term commitments and reciprocal obligations among friends, affiliative obedience, and interdependence (e.g., Diaz-Loving & Draguns, 1999) . In each of our studies, we included an entity theory measure to determine the extent of overlap between the implicit entity and implicit trait theory constructs.
Our specific hypotheses were the following:
Hypothesis 1: A coherent dimension (or dimensions) of individual differences-contrasting those who believe that behavior is determined more by traits (implicit trait theorists) versus context (implicit contextual theorists)-exists in all cultures.
Hypothesis 2:
The following belief components of implicit trait theorists will cohere on a single dimension (e.g., in factor analysis): (a) belief in the longitudinal stability of traits; (b) belief in the cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behavior; (c) a belief in the ability to predict individuals' behavior from their traits; (d) the belief that traits can be inferred from relatively few behavioral instances; and (e) the belief that people can be accurately described and understood in terms of their personality traits.
Hypothesis 3: Implicit trait beliefs will be at most moderately associated with implicit entity theory beliefs.
Hypothesis 4:
In all cultures, persons with more independent self-construals have stronger beliefs about the traitedness of behavior (i.e., tend to be implicit trait theorists), whereas persons with more interdependent self-construals have weaker beliefs about the traitedness of behavior (i.e., tend to be implicit contextual theorists).
Hypothesis 5: Persons in individualistic cultures have stronger implicit trait beliefs than do persons in collectivistic cultures.
Study 1: Item Development and Structure
In Study 1 we tried out items that assess the hypothesized five components of implicit trait theory beliefs, obtained an initial look at the structure of this domain, and examined the relationship between implicit trait and entity theories.
Method Sample
A total of 266 college students (74 men, 192 women) at Washington State University (n ϭ 242) and Chaminade University in Hawaii (n ϭ 24) provided complete data. Mean age was 22.6 years (SD ϭ 4.98). Students from all year levels (i.e., freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and a variety of major fields of study were sampled. Ethnic background was as follows: White/Caucasian (n ϭ 197), Asian/Pacific Islander (n ϭ 25), Latino (n ϭ 8), African American (n ϭ 3), Native American (n ϭ 2), multiracial (n ϭ 20), other (n ϭ 4), and not reporting (n ϭ 7). We eliminated 2 participants who rated their ability to read an English questionnaire as poor, leaving 264 participants.
Instruments
Personality Beliefs Inventory (PBI). Items were written to assess trait versus contextual beliefs for each of the five belief components, which we refer to as longitudinal stability, cross-situational consistency, predictive validity, trait inference, and general understanding components. Some items refer to personality traits in general, whereas others refer to specific traits. Because implicit beliefs might vary for different traits (Gidron, Koehler, & Tversky, 1993; Rothbart & Park, 1986) , we selected both positive and negative traits from each of the Big Five domains (Goldberg, 1990) . Similarly, some contextual items refer to situations or longitudinal change in general, whereas others refer to specific situations, roles, statuses, and relationships, consistent with the conception of contextuality described earlier. Representative items for each component are shown in the Appendix. For Study 1, we tried out 18 -25 items for each component, with a balanced number of implicit trait and contextual items. Participants responded to the items using a 6-point bipolar scale of agreement: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree.
Entity theory measure. We administered a five-item version of Dweck's (2000) domain-general entity theory measure. Three items measure entity beliefs (e.g., "The kind of person someone is, is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much"); two reverse-keyed items measure incremental beliefs (e.g., "Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change their basic characteristics"). We modified the verbal anchors of Dweck's 6-point agreement scale to the 6-point scale used with the PBI. Using principal-axis factor analysis, we confirmed that a single bipolar dimension provided an adequate representation of the scale's structure; all five items loaded between |.67| and |.75| on the first factor. Dweck and her colleagues have reported alpha reliability values ranging from .70 to the .90s and test-retest reliability values in the .80s (e.g., Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; . Alpha reliability in the present sample was .85.
Procedure
Student volunteers were recruited in classes, completed the two questionnaires on their own time, and returned them to class for pick-up by the researchers. Students completed the PBI, then the entity theory measure, and received extra credit for participation.
Results

Structure of Implicit Trait Beliefs
We factor analyzed the PBI item pool using principal-axis solutions with oblique (oblimin) rotations. The pattern of eigenvalues suggested that up to five factors might be meaningful (the first 10 eigenvalues were 12.27, 6.61, 5.10, 4.07, 3.16, 2.34, 2.28, 2.19, 2.00, and 1.94). We first examined the one-factor solution to determine if a single bipolar dimension contrasting implicit trait and contextual beliefs would emerge. The factor was a general trait beliefs factor and was only weakly bipolar; most of the contextual beliefs items had negative loadings only in the Ϫ.10 to Ϫ.25 range. In the two-factor solution, the two factors were interpretable as general trait and contextual beliefs dimensions. Forty-seven trait beliefs items, representing all five belief components, had loadings of .30 or higher on the first factor. Thirty-four contextual beliefs items, again representing all five belief components, had loadings of .30 or higher on the second factor. The two factors were essentially orthogonal (r ϭ Ϫ.06). In the three-, four-, and fivefactor solutions, the number of additional items with high loadings was small. The third factor was defined primarily by the trait beliefs items from the general understanding component, which split off from the general trait beliefs factor. The fourth and fifth factors were not very interpretable. 1 1 In two of the three studies in this article, we compared factor pattern matrices obtained with the total U.S. sample and with the more ethnically homogeneous White/European American subsample. Congruence coefficients (Tucker, 1951) between matched factors all exceeded .97. That is, inclusion of the small number of ethnic minority participants did not affect the factor structure of the PBI items. Therefore, only the factor solutions for the total U.S. samples are discussed in each study.
Relating Implicit Trait and Entity Theories
We correlated regression-method factor scores for the implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions with the entity theory measure. Estimated alpha reliabilities for the trait and contextual beliefs dimensions were .92 and .85, respectively. We found modest tendencies for individuals with stronger entity theory beliefs to exhibit stronger trait beliefs (r ϭ .28, p Ͻ .01) and weaker contextual beliefs (r ϭ Ϫ.19, p Ͻ .01).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 indicated that (a) implicit trait and contextual beliefs can be reliably assessed (Hypothesis 1); and (b) these general belief dimensions are comprised of the hypothesized belief components (Hypothesis 2). The finding of two distinct dimensions may indicate that individuals can simultaneously hold both trait and contextual beliefs; that is, lay persons, like many personality psychologists, may be implicit interaction theorists. As expected, there were only modest, yet sensible, relationships between implicit trait and contextual beliefs and entity theory beliefs (Hypothesis 3). Entity theorists, who believe in fixed traits, had modest tendencies to endorse trait beliefs and disagree with contextual beliefs.
Study 2: U.S. Replication and Validation Our goals in Study 2 were to (a) revise the implicit theory measure (PBI); (b) replicate its structure; and (c) obtain some additional validity evidence. Participants responded to a revised PBI, an entity theory measure, and a nonverbal (pictorial) behavior prediction task that assessed individuals' judgments about the cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behavior. It was expected that greater endorsement of implicit trait beliefs would be associated with greater expectations of cross-situational consistency.
Method Sample
Participants were 266 college students (100 men, 166 women) from Washington State University. Mean age was 20.2 years (SD ϭ 2.31). Students from all year levels (i.e., freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and a variety of major fields of study were represented. Data from 5 international students were excluded. Ethnic backgrounds of the remaining participants (n ϭ 261) were as follows: 233 White/Caucasian, 5 Asian/Pacific Islander, 7 biracial, 5 Native American, 3 Chicano/Latino, 1 African American, and 7 other or not reporting.
Instruments Personality Beliefs Inventory (PBI).
An 84-item version of the PBI was administered; 75 items had been used in Study 1, and 9 items were new or revised.
Entity theory measure. The entity theory measure used in Study 1 was again administered. A principal-axis factor analysis again supported a single bipolar factor with item loadings ranging from |.63| to |.73|. Alpha reliability in the Study 2 sample was .81.
Behavior Prediction Questionnaire (BPQ). Several researchers have used variants of a behavior prediction task, in which participants judge the likelihood of an individual performing a particular trait-relevant behavior, given prior information about the individual's same-trait behavior in a different situation (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 2002) . Typically, this information is presented to respondents in the form of verbal scenarios.
The PBI uses a verbal format, so we sought to reduce method variance by devising an analogous task using a nonverbal (pictorial) format. We adapted items from the Nonverbal Personality Questionnaire (NPQ; Paunonen, Jackson, & Keinonen, 1990 ) for this purpose.
2 The NPQ measures 16 of Murray's (1938) needs (traits) by presenting respondents with line drawings depicting situational behaviors of a central figure that reflect these needs. We paired pictures (line drawings) from this instrument that measured either the same trait (18 pairs) or a different trait (13 pairs). For example, one item (picture pair) depicted two nurturance behaviors; the first picture showed the central figure assisting a blind person cross the street, whereas the second picture showed the central figure returning a fallen bird nest and young chicks to a tree. We asked respondents to assume that the central figure had already performed the behavior in the first picture and then to rate the likelihood that the central figure would perform the situational behavior depicted in the second picture. Ratings were made on a 7-point likelihood scale: extremely unlikely, very unlikely, moderately unlikely, neither likely nor unlikely, moderately likely, very likely, extremely likely.
Paunonen and colleagues, using factor and reliability analyses, have demonstrated the cross-cultural relevance of the behaviors depicted in the pictures as exemplars of the designated traits (e.g., Paunonen et al., 1996) . In a pilot study, we had five judges complete a preliminary version of the task. We replaced 6 (of 62) pictures that were not interpreted in a consensus manner. We anticipated that respondents with stronger implicit trait beliefs would provide higher likelihood ratings for the same-trait picture pairs (but not different-trait picture pairs), because they would view behavioral manifestations of the same trait to be more consistent across situational contexts than would respondents with weaker implicit trait beliefs. Inversely, respondents with stronger contextual beliefs should provide lower likelihood ratings for the same-trait pictures, because they would see behavior determined more by situational context than traits.
Procedure
Students were recruited in classes, completed the three questionnaires on their own time, and returned them to class for pick-up by the researchers. Students completed the PBI, entity theory measure, and behavior prediction task, in that order, and received extra credit for participation.
Results
Replication of Implicit Theory Structure
We again performed principal-axis factor analyses with oblique (oblimin) rotations (the first eight eigenvalues were 10.31, 5.40, 4.10, 3.40, 2.47, 2.20, 1.98, and 1.95). One basis for selecting the number of factors is a replication criterion. We found the following congruence coefficients (Tucker, 1951) between the best-matched factors in Studies 1 and 2, which were computed across the 75 items that were included in both studies: for the one-factor solution, .92; for the two-factor solution, .90 and .87; for the threefactor solution, .93, .83, and .70; for the four-factor solution, .86, .73, .71, and .56. Thus, factor replication was fairly good for two factors but decreased substantially in the three-and four-factor solutions. This result favored the more parsimonious two-factor solution. The two factors were again interpretable as general trait and contextual beliefs dimensions, which were again largely orthogonal (r ϭ Ϫ.12).
Relating Implicit Trait and Entity Theories
As in Study 1, when we correlated scores on the entity theory measure with factor scores for the trait and contextual beliefs factors (estimated ␣s of .90 and .80 for the two factor scores), we found only modest tendencies for individuals with stronger entity theory beliefs to exhibit stronger trait beliefs (r ϭ .18, p Ͻ .01) and weaker contextual beliefs (r ϭ Ϫ.18, p Ͻ .01).
Implicit Theories and Behavior Prediction
Single BPQ items (picture-pairs) might not be highly reliable. Therefore, we factor analyzed the 31 items to identify a smaller number of reliable dimensions (principal-axis analyses with oblimin rotations were used). The pattern of eigenvalues showed a break after the first two factors and the two factors were clearly interpretable as same-trait and different-trait dimensions (the first eight eigenvalues were 4.99, 2.90, 1.76, 1.71, 1.35, 1.33, 1.23, and 1.13). All 18 of the same-trait items had their highest loading on the first factor (range of loadings ϭ .17-.72; M ϭ .43). Eleven of 13 different-trait items had their highest loading on the second factor (range of loadings ϭ .12-.66; M ϭ .35). Alpha reliabilities for the same-trait and different-trait factor scores were estimated as .78 and .64, respectively.
As predicted, factor scores for the PBI trait beliefs factor correlated positively with the BPQ same-trait factor (r ϭ .28, p Ͻ .01). That is, individuals with stronger trait beliefs expected greater cross-situational consistency for behavioral manifestations of the same trait. Of interest, those with stronger trait beliefs also showed a modest tendency to expect less cross-situational consistency for behavioral manifestations of different traits (r ϭ Ϫ.19, p Ͻ .01). This is probably a meaningful result; individuals with stronger trait beliefs-who view traits as stable internal dispositions-apparently tend to view the coexistence or manifestation of incompatible traits in the same person as less probable. Inversely, factor scores for the PBI contextual beliefs factor correlated positively with the different-trait factor of the BPQ (r ϭ .28, p Ͻ .01). Although not predicted a priori, this may also be a sensible result; individuals who have stronger contextual beliefs-who view traits as less central in understanding persons and their behavior-are less likely to view as unexpected behaviors associated with different or incompatible traits. One prediction was not supported. Individuals with stronger contextual beliefs did not expect less crosssituational consistency for behavioral manifestations of the same trait; the negative correlation between the contextual beliefs dimension and the same-trait behavior prediction factor was not statistically significant (r ϭ Ϫ.05, p Ͼ .05).
Discussion
The results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions can be reliably measured and replicated across U.S. samples (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and that implicit trait and entity theories are only modestly related (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the results of Study 2 provide some evidence for the validity of the implicit trait theory measure using a nonverbal behavior prediction task, although the evidence was more consistent for trait beliefs than for contextual beliefs. This validity evidence may be particularly persuasive because viewing and interpreting pictorial depictions of situational behaviors may resemble more closely the everyday task of behavioral observation and inference than will responses to verbal scenarios.
Study 3: Implicit Trait Theories and Self-Construals in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures
In Study 3, we investigated the generalizability of the implicit trait theory construct and measure across a relatively individualistic culture (United States) and a relatively collectivistic culture (Mexico). We also tested, in both cultures, our hypothesis that independent self-construals predict implicit trait beliefs and interdependent self-construals predict implicit contextual beliefs (Hypothesis 4). Finally, we expected that U.S. participants, as compared with Mexican participants, would average higher in trait beliefs and independent self-construals and lower in contextual beliefs and interdependent self-construals (Hypothesis 5).
Method
Sample U. S. sample. U.S. participants were 249 college students (99 men, 150 women) from Washington State University. Mean age was 20.9 years (SD ϭ 3.39). All year levels (i.e., freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and a variety of major fields of study were represented. Self-reported ethnic backgrounds were as follows: 211 White/Caucasian, 10 Chicano/Latino, 9 Asian/Pacific Islander, 3 biracial, 2 Native American, 1 African American, and 13 other or not reporting.
Mexican sample. Mexican participants were 268 Mexican college students (73 men, 195 women). Students were recruited in classes at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City (n ϭ 238) and the Autonomous University of Baja California (n ϭ 30). Mean age was 20.4 years (SD ϭ 2.92). All year levels (i.e., freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) were represented. Most of the students (87%) were majoring in social sciences; the remainder in medicine and public health (9%) or other majors (4%). All participants were Mexican citizens, with the following self-reported ethnic backgrounds: 258 Mestizo, 5 Indigenous, 4 Mexican American, and 1 Chicano/Chicana. Mestizos, who are of mixed Spanish and indigenous Indian ethnicity, are the majority ethnic group in Mexico.
Instruments Personality Beliefs Inventory (PBI).
A 77-item version of the PBI was used, which included (a) the best items from Study 2, (b) 19 new items to increase the length of some components, and (c) 8 new items that referred to traits not being useful in understanding persons or their behavior (e.g., "Knowing a person's personality characteristics is not very helpful in understanding that person"). The latter were added because the general trait and contextual beliefs dimensions were not yet represented by any reversekeyed (i.e., negatively loading) items. All instruments were translated from English to Spanish by bilingual graduate students in psychology using the back-translation method (Brislin, 1980) . Entity theory measure. The same entity theory measure was again used. A principal-axis factor analysis in each culture revealed a single bipolar dimension that was highly congruent across cultures (Tucker's ⌽ ϭ .99). The alpha reliabilities in the two samples were also comparable (.70 in the U.S. sample, .74 in the Mexico sample). (Singelis, 1994 ) was used to measure independent and interdependent self-construals. Items were rated using our 6-point agreement scale rather than the 7-point agreement scale used by Singelis (1994) . Alpha reliabilities of about .70 have been reported for both the Independent and Interdependent scales and the validity of the instrument has been demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g., Singelis, 1994; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995) . In separate-culture principal-axis solutions with oblique (oblimin) rotations, we identified independent and interdependent self-construal dimensions in two-factor solutions. Three items that loaded on the wrong factor in both cultures and one item that had weak loadings were eliminated. With the remaining 26 items, the independent and interdependent factors were highly congruent across cultures; both congruence coefficients were .93 (Tucker, 1951) . Alpha reliabilities for the 14-item Independent scale and the 12-item Interdependent scale were .77 and .67, respectively, in the U.S. sample, and .69 and .74, respectively, in the Mexican sample.
Self-Construal Scale (SCS). The 30-item SCS
Procedure
In the U.S. sample, student volunteers were recruited in classes, completed the three questionnaires on their own time, and returned them to class for pick-up by the researchers. Students received extra credit for participation. In the Mexican sample, student volunteers completed the three questionnaires during regular classes. Students in both samples completed the PBI first, followed by the entity theory measure and the SCS.
Results
Cross-Cultural Structural Equivalence of Implicit Trait Theory Dimensions
PBI item-level structure. We first examined principal-axis factor solutions with oblimin rotations at the item level. Congruence coefficients (Tucker, 1951) computed between best-matched factors across the two cultures indicated fair to good factor similarity for solutions of up to three factors, but not four factors: .86 for the one-factor solution; .86 and .90 for the two-factor solution; .91, .86, and .84 for the three-factor solution, and .91, .83, .80, and .37 for the four-factor solution. In both cultures, the first two factors were general trait and contextual beliefs dimensions. The third factor was defined by the new reverse-keyed trait beliefs items plus some contextual beliefs items about roles being more important than traits in understanding behavior. In the two-factor solutions, the new reverse-keyed trait items were not ideal because they had dual loadings and behaved differently across cultures; they were better (inverse) markers of the trait beliefs factor in the U.S. sample, but better (positive) markers of the contextual beliefs factor in the Mexican sample. We obtained greater factor replication across cultures by eliminating these eight trait reversal items, plus six other items that functioned differently across cultures. When we factor analyzed the remaining 63 items, the two-factor solutions were quite comparable (congruence coefficients of .91 and .90). In both cultures, the two factors were essentially orthogonal (r ϭ .00 in the United States and r ϭ Ϫ.07 in Mexico). The rotated pattern matrices are shown in the Appendix.
Further refinement of the PBI items for cross-cultural use would be beneficial, particularly if one wishes to measure each belief component separately (corrected item-total correlations and alpha reliabilities for each component are shown in the Appendix). For most of the components, one or two items have modest loadings in one or the other culture and could be revised or retranslated.
Nonetheless, the principal-axis analysis reveals that the general trait and contextual beliefs dimensions do encompass the hypothesized belief components in both cultures (Hypothesis 2).
Higher order structure of implicit belief components. We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and the AMOS 4.0 program (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) to test more formally the higher order structure of the belief components across cultures. The general trait and contextual beliefs dimensions were exogenous variables and item "parcels" or subscales measuring the belief components were the observed indicators. The use of item parcels has several advantages over the use of individual items, including greater reliability and the reduction of specific variance (e.g., Kishton & Widaman, 1994) . The 10 parcels or subscales were comprised of 3-12 items and their alpha reliabilities ranged from .58 to .72 in the U.S. sample and from .50 to .73 in the Mexican sample (see Appendix).
As recommended by Byrne (2001) and others, we first tested this and the other measurement models in the study separately in the U.S. and Mexican samples. Minor model respecifications made in one or both cultures, if any, were then incorporated into tests of the cross-cultural (multigroup) models. For more succinct presentation, we report the details of model fit only for the cross-cultural models, comparing the difference in fit between constrained and unconstrained models. In the constrained models, factor loadings, covariances between latent variables, and residual covariances (but not the variances of exogenous variables) were constrained to equality across cultures, whereas in the unconstrained models they were not. Figure 1 shows the standardized estimates for the constrained cross-cultural model (Model 1) testing our hypothesis about the implicit trait and contextual beliefs components (Hypothesis 2).
3
All paths shown were statistically significant (critical ratio [C.R.] Ͼ 2.0). Table 1 shows fit indices for Model 1 and other crosscultural models tested in Study 3. The fit of Model 1 was very good and was not significantly worse than the fit of the unconstrained model, ⌬ 2 (15, N ϭ 517) ϭ 18.35. As seen in Figure 1 , all of the primary loadings relating the implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions to the component indicators were moderate to large in size. One secondary loading relating the contextual trait inference component to the trait beliefs dimension was statistically significant but small in size and thus represents only a very modest departure from simple structure. (This secondary loading was needed for better model fit in the U.S. sample, but not the Mexican sample.) This secondary loading makes some sense. Respondents who endorse the contextual trait inference items believe that it is difficult to infer traits from few behavioral instances; nonetheless, trait inference may eventually result. The model also includes five error covariances that were needed in one or both cultures to account for greater shared uniqueness among selected belief components that were more positively or negatively correlated with each other than with other components. Overall, these results provide good cross-cultural support for our hypothesis about the component beliefs associated with implicit trait and contextual theories (Hypothesis 2).
Cross-Cultural Equivalence of Entity Theory and SelfConstrual Measurement Models
In the simple structure model for the entity theory measure, the entity theory construct was an exogenous variable and three item parcels, comprised of 2, 2, and 1 items, were endogenous indicators (alphas for the two-item parcels ranged from .28 to .51 across the two cultures). No respecification of the model was needed when tested separately in each culture (in which case it is a saturated model). As seen in Table 1 (Model 2), the fit of the constrained cross-cultural model was excellent. The model was accepted by the overall chi-square test, 2 (2, N ϭ 517) ϭ 2.01, p ϭ .37, and the fit of the constrained model was not significantly worse than the fit of the unconstrained model, ⌬ 2 (2, N ϭ 517) ϭ 2.01. Factor loadings for the three item parcels ranged from .49 to .78.
In the simple structure model for the self-construal measure, the independent and interdependent self-construal constructs were exogenous variables, each with three item parcels as endogenous indicators (the 14 independent items were randomly distributed into three parcels, as were the 12 interdependent items; alphas for the parcels ranged from .31 to .56 across the two cultures). We added three error covariances between item parcels that correlated more positively or negatively with each other in the Mexican sample than did most item parcels (no model respecifications were needed in the U.S. sample). As seen in Table 1 (Model 3), the fit of the constrained cross-cultural model was excellent. The model was accepted by the overall chi-square test, 2 (18, N ϭ 517) ϭ 25.89, p ϭ .13, and the fit of the constrained model was not significantly worse than the fit of the unconstrained model, ⌬ 2 (8, N ϭ 517) ϭ 13.60. Factor loadings for the item parcels on the respective dimensions ranged from .53 to .78 across the two cultures. In sum, the measurement models for all three instruments can be considered equivalent across the two cultures. We next tested confirmatory and structural models of interest using the constrained measurement models for each of these instruments. Table 1 shows the fit indices for the best cross-cultural CFA model relating entity theory beliefs to implicit trait and contextual beliefs (Model 4). In this model, the covariance between entity theory and contextual beliefs was constrained to equality across cultures, whereas the covariance between entity theory and trait beliefs was unconstrained (i.e., freely estimated). The fit of this model was acceptable and was not significantly worse than the unconstrained model in which both covariances were freely estimated, ⌬ 2 (1, N ϭ 517) ϭ 0.10. An alternative model, in which the covariance between entity theories and trait beliefs was also constrained to equality across cultures was significantly worse than the unconstrained model, ⌬ 2 (2, N ϭ 517) ϭ 11.32. The estimated (constrained) correlations between entity theory and contextual beliefs were Ϫ.25 in the U.S. sample and Ϫ.21 in the Mexico sample (the standardized estimates differ slightly because the variances of the exogenous variables were not constrained to be equal across cultures). The freely estimated correlations between entity theory and trait beliefs were .10 in the U.S. sample and .42 in the Mexico sample. As in Studies 1 and 2, the entity theory construct was only modestly to moderately related to the implicit trait and contextual beliefs constructs (Hypothesis 3). Figure 2 shows the best structural equations model relating self-construals to implicit trait and contextual beliefs (for schematic simplicity the measurement models for each instrument are Note. Dashes indicate that GFI and RMR indices were not computed for mean and covariance structure models in AMOS 4.0. GFI ϭ goodness-of-fit index; CFI ϭ comparative fit index; RMR ϭ root-mean-square residual; RMSEA ϭ root-mean-square error of approximation; PBI ϭ Personal Beliefs Inventory; SCS ϭ Self-Construal Scale.
Relating Self-Construals to Implicit Trait and Contextual Beliefs
Figure 2. Standardized parameter estimates for structural model relating self-controls to implicit trait and contextual beliefs. U.S. parameters and Mexican parameters, respectively, are separated by slashes (/). Measurement models are not depicted but were included in tests of the structural model. Res 1 and Res 2 represent residual error terms in the prediction of implicit trait beliefs and implicit contextual beliefs, respectively. not depicted). We had hypothesized a discriminant or differentialprediction model in which (a) independent self-construals predict trait beliefs but not contextual beliefs; and (b) interdependent self-construals predict contextual beliefs but not trait beliefs (Hypothesis 4). Initial tests of this discriminant model revealed that (a) adding a causal path from independent self-construals to contextual beliefs did not significantly improve the model, but (b) adding a path from interdependent self-construal to trait beliefs did. Finally, the model in which the three causal paths were constrained to be equal across cultures fit the data well (see Model 5 in Table  1 ) and was not significantly worse than the unconstrained model in which these three paths were freely estimated in the two cultures, ⌬ 2 (4, N ϭ 517)ϭ 11.27. Figure 2 shows the standardized parameter estimates for each path in the model, with the U.S. and Mexican estimates separated by slashes (/). Because the variances of the exogenous variables were not constrained to be equal across cultures, the standardized estimates (but not the nonstandardized estimates) can differ slightly across cultures. Referring to Figure 2 , we can conclude that our hypothesis linking self-construals to implicit beliefs was partially supported (Hypothesis 4). As expected, in both cultures independent self-construals showed a moderate ability to predict implicit trait beliefs. To a lesser extent, interdependent selfconstruals predicted contextual beliefs, as expected. However, although differential prediction was good for independent selfconstruals, interdependent self-construals predicted trait and contextual beliefs to about the same extent.
Cultural Mean Differences in Self-Construals and Implicit Theories
To determine whether cultural mean differences in selfconstruals and implicit theories conformed to expectations (see Hypothesis 5), we performed a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on raw scale scores and, for each instrument, multigroup mean and covariance structures (MACS) analyses. Comparisons of raw scores are risky if cross-cultural measurement invariance is not first demonstrated. However, raw score means are easily interpreted in terms of the original rating scale units. MACS analyses have several advantages including disattenuation of measurement error and built-in tests of cross-cultural metric equivalence (Byrne, 2001 ). However, MACS analyses can be used to estimate only the difference between the two cultural means, not the means themselves. Also, to identify MACS models, and to establish metric equivalence across cultures, it is necessary to constrain all factor loadings and observed variable intercepts in the measurement models to be equal across cultures (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999, p. 290; Byrne, 2001, p. 237) . The legitimacy of these constraints can be evaluated using the model fit indices, which are shown in Table 1 (see Models 6 to 8; goodness-of-fit and root-mean-square residual indices are not computed for MACS models in AMOS 4.0). The indices show that the imposed constraints on the MACS models and the assumption of metric equivalence were reasonable for all three instruments.
Because the results of the cultural mean comparisons were the same in the raw score analyses (MANOVA) and latent means analyses (MACS), we present them together in Table 2 . For each construct, raw scores were derived by computing respondents' means across all items scored for the dimension (reverse-keying when necessary). In a MANOVA with culture and gender as independent variables and implicit theories and self-construals as dependent variables, the main effects for culture (Wilks's ϭ .78), F(5, 505) ϭ 27.89, p Ͻ .01, and gender (Wilks's ϭ .97), F(5, 505) ϭ 3.31, p Ͻ .01, were statistically significant, whereas the Culture ϫ Gender interaction effect was not significant (Wilks's ϭ .99), F(5, 505) ϭ 1.44, p Ͼ .05. In follow-up ANOVAs, the only significant gender effect was for implicit trait theories, with women (M ϭ 4.56, SD ϭ 0.54) averaging about one-third standard deviations higher than men (M ϭ 4.39, SD ϭ 0.55).
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As expected, the U.S. sample, as compared with the Mexican sample, averaged significantly higher in trait beliefs (positive values for the latent mean differences in Table 2 indicate that the Mexican sample averaged higher; negative values indicate that the U.S. sample averaged higher). However, the U.S. sample also averaged lower in independent self-construals and higher in interdependent self-construals, neither of which was expected. No prediction was made regarding entity theory beliefs; the Mexican sample averaged higher. Contrary to expectations, there were no cultural differences in contextual beliefs.
Discussion
In Study 3 we demonstrated good cross-cultural equivalence of the implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions and their components (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and again showed that these dimensions are only modestly to moderately related to implicit entity theories (Hypothesis 3). There was some evidence that trait and entity beliefs are more strongly associated in Mexican students than in U.S. students. However, the relationship between trait and entity beliefs in U.S. samples was stronger in Studies 1 and 2 than in Study 3. Therefore, perhaps not too much should be made of the apparent cultural difference in this relationship in Study 3. As hypothesized, independent self-construals predicted the strength of implicit trait beliefs but not implicit contextual beliefs (Hypothesis 4). However, interdependent self-construals were modest predictors of both implicit trait and contextual beliefs. Acceptable metric equivalence was demonstrated for the implicit theory and selfconstrual measures, making it reasonable to make cross-cultural mean comparisons. The cultural mean differences that we found are considered further in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
Structure and Replicability of Implicit Trait Theories
In three studies, we showed that (a) implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions can be reliably identified and assessed-alpha reliability estimates ranged from .89 to .92 for the trait beliefs dimension and from .80 to .85 for the contextual beliefs dimension; and (b) the structure of such beliefs replicates well across U.S. and Mexican samples (Hypothesis 1). In doing so, we also demonstrated that implicit trait and contextual theories are comprised of an integrated set of component beliefs, which address the longitudinal stability and predictive validity of traits, crosssituational consistency, the ability to infer traits from few behavioral instances, and the importance of traits versus contextual factors in describing or understanding individuals. It will now be important to extend this research to a greater variety of cultures. Presently, the "weakest link" among the belief components is the general understanding component of contextual beliefs. Fewer good items have been identified thus far for this component, and items from this component have been less consistent in loading highly on the general contextual beliefs dimension across studies. One likely problem with these items, recognized belatedly, is that they make reference to the personality, roles, and relationships of the respondent ("my relationships"), unlike the items for the other components, which refer to people in general. Nonetheless, this component did load moderately on the general contextual beliefs dimension in both cultures (see Figure 1) .
A remaining issue involves the apparent independence of the trait and contextual beliefs dimensions and the possible role of acquiescence response bias. Related to this is the difficulty of identifying items that define the inverse pole of the implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions (i.e., reverse-keyed items). In our initial item-writing efforts, we had anticipated that trait and contextual belief items might be inversely related, leading to a single bipolar dimension. Instead, we consistently found that the trait and contextual beliefs dimensions were only slightly inversely related and that two dimensions were needed to account adequately for the covariation among the items. In Study 3, we tried out new reverse-keyed items, but in both cultures these items had dual loadings and were thus not ideal.
The issue of bipolarity versus independence, and a lack of reverse-keyed items, has arisen in the development of several other prominent measures of cultural or implicit theory dimensions including a measure of individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and the SCS (Singelis, 1994) . In factor analyses, these researchers have identified separate individualism and collectivism, or independent and interdependent selfconstrual, dimensions and argued that the independence of these dimensions makes theoretical sense. Individuals in all cultures, they argue, have both individualistic and collectivistic tendencies, although cultures likely differ in the typical salience of each orientation. Singelis (1994) argued that the orthogonality of independent and interdependent self-construal dimensions is not an artifact of acquiescence response bias, despite the absence of any reverse-keyed items in his SCS. In developing their entity theory measures, Dweck and colleagues also experienced difficulties identifying incremental theory items that defined the inverse pole of their bipolar entity versus incremental theory dimension, and noted that when incremental items were used, they tended to be endorsed by entity theorists as well . 5 We believe the relative independence of the implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions may be a theoretically meaningful finding and that individuals in both the United States and Mexico tend to be implicit interaction theorists. That is, they believe in the stability, predictive value, and importance of traits, but also in the moderating role of contextual factors. This interpretation receives support from a recent study by Norenzayan et al. (2002) , who found that endorsements of paragraphs describing dispositionist and situationist views were uncorrelated (i.e., independent) for both Americans and Koreans and that interactionist descriptions were endorsed more than either dispositionist or situationist perspectives by both cultural groups. At the same time, however, we suspect that the relative independence of the implicit trait and contextual beliefs dimensions might also be augmented to some extent by acquiescence response bias. This issue warrants further investigation.
Implicit Trait Versus Entity Theories
The modest correlations found between the implicit trait and entity theory constructs may reflect, in part, the broader, multi-5 Recently, Dweck and colleagues successfully identified incremental items that define the inverse pole of the entity theory dimension by writing strongly stated incremental items (e.g., "No matter what kind of a person someone is, they can always change very much"; . Such items serve a useful psychometric function by better balancing item keying within scales and reducing the potential effects of acquiescence response bias. However, it is conceivable that such items will capture less accurately the typical beliefs of incremental theorists, which might be consistent with more moderate change in individuals. component nature of the former construct, which goes beyond the stability versus malleability aspect encompassed by the latter construct. The trait and contextual beliefs items also appear to be more probabilistic, and less extreme, than the entity theory items; entity theorists appear to take a more rigid stance on the possibility of change than most trait theorists would. One caveat: When we designed these studies, we were familiar with Dweck's domaingeneral entity theory measure, which had been used in a study of lay dispositionism that was most relevant to our studies . Recently, however, Dweck (2000) presented a measure that can be used to assess entity theories specifically in the personality domain. This domain-specific measure may show stronger relationships with our implicit beliefs dimensions, a possibility that we will investigate.
Relating Self-Construals and Implicit Trait Theories
In both U.S. and Mexican samples, independent self-construals predicted stronger endorsement of trait beliefs, but not contextual beliefs. These results are consistent with the expectations of cultural psychologists (Church, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1998 ) and individualism-collectivism theory (Triandis, 1995) . Individuals who view themselves as autonomous and unique agents are more likely to believe in the stability and predictive value of personality traits, the importance of traits in causal inferences, and the importance of traits in describing or understanding themselves and others.
Also as expected, interdependent self-construals showed a modest to moderate ability to predict implicit contextual beliefs. That is, individuals who view themselves as more interdependent or connected to others tend to believe that contextual factors such as situations, relationships, and roles are important factors in understanding persons and their behavior. These findings also conform to the expectations of cultural psychologists and are consistent with the findings of Singelis (1994) , who found that interdependent self-construals, but not independent self-construals, predicted situational attributions of behavior.
We did not expect, however, that interdependent self-construals would also predict implicit trait beliefs to some extent. Nonetheless, in retrospect, we believe this finding makes sense. Many of the items in the interdependent SCS do, in fact, imply a belief in traits or trait-relevant behavior; however, the traits associated with the scale are more other-oriented or self-sacrificing than the autonomous or agentic traits associated with independent selfconstruals. The interdependent items refer to trait-relevant behaviors associated with modesty, altruism, generosity, respectfulness, cooperativeness, politeness, loyalty, and conformity (e.g., I respect people who are modest about themselves). This finding is also consistent with Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier's (2002) contention that a plausible consequence of collectivism is valued personal traits that reflect the goals of "sacrifice for the common good and maintaining harmonious relationships with close others" (p. 5). In short, both independent and interdependent selfconstruals are associated with trait beliefs; the difference involves the traits that are most likely to be exhibited or valued. This suggests that implicit trait beliefs may be cultural universals, a conjecture that is also supported by our inspection of cultural means (see below).
Cross-Cultural Differences in Implicit Theories and Self-Construals Implicit Trait and Contextual Beliefs
As expected, the U.S. sample reported stronger trait beliefs, on average, than did the Mexican sample. This is consistent with the cultural psychology contention that traits are accorded a more important role in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Triandis, 1995) . The effect size was not large, however. Furthermore, an examination of the cultural means (see Table 2 ) reveals that both U.S. and Mexican respondents, on average, tended to agree with trait beliefs items, and agreed more with trait beliefs items than with contextual beliefs items. This suggests that respondents in both cultures tend to be lay dispositionists more than contextual theorists, at least as assessed with our self-report measure. This finding is incongruent with hypotheses based on cultural psychology, but is consistent with two recent literature reviews.
Church (2000) reviewed psychological and ethnographic evidence across cultures and concluded that "even in sociocentric cultures, persons and their behavior are described and understood to some degree in terms of personality traits, at least under appropriate conditions" (p. 674). Similarly, in a review of causal attribution literature across cultures, Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) concluded that dispositional inference is present in all cultures, although the authors left open the possibility that it might be weaker in collectivistic cultures. Choi et al. (1999) also suggested that individuals in some cultures (e.g., East Asian) are more sensitive to contextual information, assuming it is sufficiently salient (see also Norenzayan et al., 2002) . In the present study, Americans and Mexicans did not differ, on average, in the strength of their contextual beliefs. It is possible, of course, that implicit or folk beliefs about the relative importance of traits versus contextual factors will not strongly converge with the actual "traitedness" versus contextuality of self-concepts and causal inferences, but we might expect some degree of convergence (Church, 2000) . We now need studies that investigate this in a variety of cultures.
Entity Theories
There have been inconsistencies between theory and research when entity theories have been examined across cultures. In theory, entity theorists should tend to be implicit trait theorists Norenzayan et al., 2002) , as was the case in our studies. Also, from a cultural psychology perspective, implicit trait beliefs should be stronger in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures, which we also found to be the case. Together, these theories and findings suggest that entity theories should also be stronger in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures. Although this was the case in a study that compared Americans and Koreans (Norenzayan et al., 2002) , it was not the case in two studies that compared Americans and Hong Kong Chinese Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997, Study 4) . Our findings are most consistent with those of , who also found that entity theory beliefs are stronger in collectivistic than individualistic cultures.
The prediction of stronger trait beliefs in individualistic cultures is well-grounded in cultural psychology and individualism-collectivism theory, whereas the theoretical basis for expecting stronger entity theory beliefs in collectivistic cultures has not yet been as fully elaborated. did link stronger entity theories (in the morality domain) with duty-based moral codes and noted that collectivistic (or at least Asian) cultures tend to endorse duty-based moral codes. Again, researchers will need to compare implicit trait and entity theories across a broader range of individualistic and collectivistic cultures to better understand the pattern of cultural differences observed.
Self-Construals
The most unexpected finding was that the Americans, who are thought to be individualistic, averaged higher on the interdependent self-construal measure, whereas the Mexicans, who are presumed to be collectivistic, averaged higher on the independent SCS. We considered a number of explanations for these findings. Cross-cultural measurement inequivalence is a potential problem in cross-cultural mean comparisons, but the MACS analyses indicated that metric equivalence was good. The MACS results also reduce concerns about differential response styles across cultures, which in any case would be more of an issue had the Mexican students averaged higher or lower on both self-construal scales, which they did not.
Plausible explanations might involve issues of sample representativeness and related reference group effects. Our Mexican college students might have more independent and less interdependent self-construals than Mexicans who are more representative of the general population. Our U.S. college students, whose means for independent and interdependent self-construals conformed more to expectations, might be more representative of their country's general population. Sato and Cameron (1999) offered a possibly related explanation in their attempt to explain why their Canadian undergraduate sample unexpectedly averaged higher in interdependent self-construals than a sample of Japanese students. They speculated that "participants may be comparing themselves with different norms set by their cultural environments when responding to the items" (p. 433). Analogously, perhaps the Mexican students in our sample implicitly judged themselves to be relatively independent and less interdependent in comparison with their cultural norm. Heine, Lehman, Peng, and Greenholtz (2002) have shown that such reference group effects can lead to results that actually reverse the expected pattern of mean cultural differences, as may have occurred here for the self-construal measure. We might expect self-construal measures to be more susceptible to reference group effects, however, than would implicit trait and entity theory measures. Self-construal measures involve judgments about one's own behavior, which may elicit social comparisons in relation to cultural norms. In contrast, the implicit theory measures assess observations or beliefs about the personalities or behaviors of people in general (i.e., beliefs about cultural phenomena or the cultural norm itself).
Finally, it is not clear from existing studies how confidently predictions about cultural differences in self-construals or individualism-collectivism can be made. The vast majority of studies have involved comparisons of U.S. nationals versus East Asian nationals, or European Americans versus Asian Americans, and some results have not conformed to expectations (Oyserman et al., 2002) . We identified only one study that compared Mexican and U.S. college students, which did find that Mexican students averaged higher than U.S. students in collectivism (Shkodriani & Gibbons, 1995) . However, Oyserman et al. (2002) , in a metaanalysis of studies since 1980, found very diverse findings in comparisons of Latin American and U.S. samples and noted the need to better understand the Latino cultural perspective in relation to individualism-collectivism. In short, there is still much to be learned regarding the status of most cultures, including Mexico, on different aspects of individualism and collectivism. Given the current status of the literature, our cultural mean differences findings for self-construals cannot necessarily be considered anomalous.
A Final Note
Finally, although the present study has gone some way toward revealing the structure, correlates, and cross-cultural functioning of the implicit trait theory construct, the ability of the scales to predict individual and cultural differences in the traitedness of self-concepts, causal attributions, self-enhancement tendencies, and related variables largely awaits further research, some of which we have begun. Such research will enable a more comprehensive assessment of the validity of cultural psychology hypotheses regarding implicit theories and their impact. Ultimately, the goal is an integration of the trait and cultural psychology perspectives that dominate current cross-cultural research on personality (Church, 2000 Note. Factor loadings Ն ͉.30͉ are shown in bold. Dashes indicate that items were not scored for component subscale because of modest item-total correlations. T ϭ implicit trait beliefs factor; C ϭ implicit contextual beliefs factor; r it ϭ corrected item-total correlations with component subscales. a Alpha reliability for component subscales.
